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Essay  
Cognition, Law, Stories 
Lorie M.  Graham* & Stephen M.  McJohn** 
Steven Pinker’s The Stuff of Thought1 explores “the view 
from language—what we can learn about human nature from 
the meanings of words and constructions and how they are 
used.”2  Cognitive science interacts in many ways with law: 
how we reason, decide, intend, moralize, and perceive.  Legal 
scholars have increasingly looked to cognitive science to re-
examine the assumptions the law makes about human 
decisionmaking.3  Cognitive science has been deployed in such 
diverse areas as contract law,4 criminal law,5 evidence,6 civil 
rights,7 trademark law,8 capital punishment,9 prosecutorial 
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 1. STEVEN PINKER, THE STUFF OF THOUGHT (2007). 
 2. Id.  at 427. 
 3. See generally STEVEN L.  WINTER, A CLEARING IN THE FOREST: LAW, 
LIFE, AND MIND (2001) (applying cognitive science to a number of issues in 
jurisprudence). 
 4. Henry E.  Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and 
Information Flow, 104 MICH.  L.  REV.  1175, 1176 (2006) (discussing how 
modularity, as in standard contract terms, can aid in mental processing of 
complexity). 
 5. Deborah W.  Denno, Crime and Consciousness: Science and 
Involuntary Acts, 87 MINN.  L.  REV.  269, 272 (2002) (proposing reforms to the 
criminal law concept of a voluntary act, because “modern neuroscientific 
research has revealed a far more fluid and dynamic relationship between 
conscious and unconscious processes”).   
 6. See, e.g., D.  Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L.  Loop, Three Card Monte, 
Monty Hall, Modus Operandi and “Offender Profiling”: Some Lessons of 
Modern Cognitive Science for the Law of Evidence, 24 CARDOZO L.  REV.  193, 
196 (2002) (“The last quarter century has seen mounting evidence that 
humans manifest specific and predictable weaknesses in dealing with certain 
kinds of information under definable conditions, which weaknesses are 
reflected in traditional proof law imperfectly or not at all.”). 
 7. Cheryl I.  Harris, Whitewashing Race: Scapegoating Culture, 94 CAL.  
L.  REV.  907, 927–28 (2006) (critiquing legal institutions premised on 
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discretion,10 jurisprudence,11 trade secrets,12 and legal 
education.13 Legal scholars have made many proposals to adapt 
legal doctrine to account for cognitive biases in 
decisionmaking,14 while a second wave has recognized that 
                                                          
colorblindness, and relying on new literature on cognitive bias, which includes 
an array of new facts about how the brain processes racial difference.  Even 
when we aspire to take no account of race, it turns out that our brains function 
to do so beneath the level of our conscious awareness); Linda Hamilton 
Krieger, The Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to 
Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN.  L.  REV.  1161, 
1186–1217 (1995); see also, e.g., Eric J.  Mitnick, Law, Cognition, and Identity, 
67 LA.  L.  REV.  823 (2007). 
 8. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for 
Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL.  L.  REV.  1581, 1587–1654 (2006) (analyzing 
trademark infringement’s likelihood of confusion test in light of the theory of 
“coherence-based reasoning”); Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: 
Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX.  L.  REV.  507 (2008) 
(cautioning about importing cognitive science into legal rules without 
empirical support). 
 9. O.  Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital 
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U.  L.  REV.  1265 (2007). 
 10. Alafair S.  Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: Some 
Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM.  & MARY L.  REV.  1587, 1590–91 (2006) 
(“A compelling body of cognitive research demonstrates that people 
systematically hold a set of cognitive biases, rendering them neither perfectly 
rational information processors, nor wholly random or irrational decision 
makers.”). 
 11. See e.g., Scott Fruehwald, The Emperor Has No Clothes: Postmodern 
Legal Thought and Cognitive Science, 23 GA.  ST.  U.  L.  REV.  375 (2006); John 
Mikhail, “Plucking the Mask of Mystery from Its Face”: Jurisprudence and 
H.L.A.  Hart, 95 GEO.  L.J.  733, 737 (2007) (reexamining H.L.A.  Hart’s legal 
philosophy “in light of recent developments in philosophy, linguistics, cognitive 
science, and law”); Cass R.  Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U.  CHI.  
L.  REV.  1175, 1194 (1997) (arguing that “[E]conomic analysis of law has 
proceeded on the basis of inaccurate understandings of decision and choice” 
that fail to account for common cognitive errors).  Specific approaches to legal 
theory may be considerably changed by cognitive science.  See Terrence 
Chorvat, Kevin McCabe &Vernon Smith, Law and Neuroeconomics, 13 SUP.  
CT.  ECON.  REV.  35 (2005); Jedediah Purdy, The Promise (and Limits) of 
Neuroeconomics, 58 ALA.  L.  REV.  1 (2006). 
 12. Yuval Feldman, The Behavioral Foundations of Trade Secrets: 
Tangibility, Authorship, and Legality, 3 J.  EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.  197 
(2006). 
 13. Deborah Jones Merritt, Legal Education in the Age of Cognitive 
Science and Advanced Classroom Technology (Ohio State Pub.  Law Working 
Paper, Paper  No.  94, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1007800. 
 14. A concise portrait of some of the many biases that can affect a group of 
decision makers: 
• The committee might overgeneralize from dramatic and 
emotionally striking events (the availability heuristic) or 
from small unrepresentative samples (the 
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cognitive errors may have benefits, both for individuals and 
society at large.15  The Supreme Court, for example, recently 
sought to guard patent law against the “distortion caused by 
hindsight bias” in assessing the inventiveness of an 
innovation.16 
The Stuff of Thought offers insights from cognitive science 
just where it overlaps the most with law: cognitive linguistics.  
Cognitive linguistics analyzes language to uncover how 
                                                          
representativeness heuristic). 
• The committee might anchor its decisionmaking on an 
arbitrary starting point and filter factual evidence through 
the lens of that bias (anchoring or cognitive dissonance). 
• The committee might impute its members’ own views and 
preferences to everyone else, an assumption that reflects 
lack of empathy or understanding of others’ different 
situations (the egocentrism bias). 
• The committee might tend to defer to experts (the expert-
deference bias, also hypervigilance) who themselves tend to 
be overconfident about their conclusions (the overconfidence 
bias). 
• If the committee is composed of like-thinking persons, 
deliberation might tend to skew the committee’s conclusions 
toward positions more extreme than those with which the 
members started (the polarization effect).  Conversely, more 
heterogeneous committees may tend to avoid the best 
solutions if they seem too radical (the extremeness aversion).  
In either event, there is a danger that committee members 
will go along with a proposal only because they think 
“everyone thinks this way” (the cascade effect). 
• If the problem is complex, the committee may be 
overwhelmed and paralyzed (information overload) or driven 
away from correct but extreme positions (the dilution effect) 
by considering too much information, and may consequently 
be unduly deferential to other decisionmakers 
(hypervigilance, noted above). 
William N.  Eskridge, Jr.  & John Ferejohn, Structuring Lawmaking to Reduce 
Cognitive Bias: A Critical View, 87 CORNELL L.  REV.  616, 621–22 (2002).  The 
authors express “skepticism about recent attempts to deploy cognitive 
psychology to support a particular institutional design or role” because it has 
identified many ways in which thinking goes awry, but not how to think more 
reliably.  Id.  at 617. 
 15. Cf.  Chris William Sanchirico, Evidence, Procedure, and the Upside of 
Cognitive Error, 57 STAN.  L.  REV.  291 (2004) (“[T]he law relies upon mental 
limitations, that it exploits cognitive shortcomings, and that it would not 
function nearly as well were humans truly perfectly rational.”); Keren 
Shapira-Ettinger & Ron  Shapira, The Constructive Value of Overconfidence 
(Bar Ilan Univ.  Pub.  Law Working Paper No.  08-01, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1079762. 
 16. KSR Int’l Co.  v.  Teleflex Inc., 127 S.  Ct.  1727, 1742 (2007); see also 
Gregory N.  Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the 
Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST.  L.J.  1391 
(2006). 
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humans use basic cognitive categories like intent, space, time, 
events, and causation.  Cognitive linguistics shows that 
language is powerful and flexible because it relies on a 
recursive structure.  Recursion is a powerful feature of human 
thought.  A number, for example, is defined recursively: the 
number before it plus one.  6 is 5 +1.  What’s 5? 5 is 4 +1–and 
so on.  This essay first looks at how The Stuff of Thought might 
offer insights into a broad range of issues in legal theory. 
Cognitive linguistics suggests that words do have a core of 
conventional meaning, which may be at odds with 
jurisprudential theories that meaning is indeterminate and 
courts accordingly have free rein in interpreting words. 
Cognitive science also suggests that people have an innate 
sense of causation, one that legal theories of causation should 
take into account.  The role of metaphor in thought is another 
area in which cognitive linguistics has insights to offer legal 
theory, because there has been considerable debate about 
whether legal metaphors control legal doctrine.  The subject of 
indirect speech also (and surprisingly) has implications for 
legal theory, because it illuminates conflicts between rules and 
the incentives they create. 
The final part of the essay explores the cognitive aspects of 
stories, an approach to cognitive science that could be 
especially suited to legal theory.  Focusing on the cognitive 
aspects of stories illuminates the cognitive tasks of law, such as 
reasoning, remembering, learning, persuading, and 
communicating.  Relying on cognitive science concepts, we 
suggest that narrative plays a fundamental role in legal 
reasoning, in such areas as memory, moral decision-making, 
reasoning by analogy, explanation, and even the organization of 
the vast amount of information that lawyers contend with.  
Lawyers deal with stories, not just legal rules or analogies.  We 
suggest a recursive definition of “story,” on the theory that 
stories, like sentences, are a basic object of thinking.  Stories 
are more complex than analogies.  A narrative approach 
provides a more dynamic view of how people think about cases. 
FROM MENTALESE TO LEGALESE – WHETHER WORDS 
HAVE A CORE OF MEANING OR ARE INDETERMINATE 
The Stuff of Thought first discusses two linked topics: what 
concepts are innate, and whether we think in language 
(whether our brain performs its basic operations using human 
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language or some other medium).  Those topics seem far 
removed from the law.  However, these are relevant to law 
because legal concepts guide the courts, whether judges are 
born with those concepts (we likely have an innate sense of 
causation, somewhat different from the legal concept of 
causation) or learn them (perfection of a security interest is 
pretty unlikely to be an innate concept).  Ultimately, the end 
result is what matters; a murderer goes to jail, whether the 
intent to kill was formed in words or another medium.  Still, it 
is interesting to analyze how concepts came to be and The Stuff 
of Thought is useful for thinking about legal reasoning in this 
manner. 
Humans use a great number of concepts.  A key question is 
how many of those are factory equipment coded in our DNA 
and how many are acquired later: learned and put together 
from more basic concepts.  The Stuff of Thought shows how 
language—verbs in particular—seems to use a short list of 
basic concepts.17 Such an “inventory of thoughts .  .  .  begins 
with some basic units, like events, states, things, substances, 
places, and goals.  It specifies the basic ways in which these 
units can do things: acting, going, changing, being, and 
having.”18  The book then further lists such distinctions made 
by language, such as actions with a goal and actions resulting 
in a state; objects that are “human or nonhuman, animate or 
inanimate, solid or aggregate”;19 events that “tak[e] up 
stretches of time [or are] ordered.”20  The Stuff of Thought 
works through our apparently innate conceptions of objects 
(how their properties are conceived), numbers (discrete for 
small numbers, approximate for large quantities), space (using 
various frames of reference as appropriate), time (which “may 
be thought of as a road on which we march, or as a parade that 
marches past us”), and events (distinguishing, most relevant 
for law, between events that just happen and events that are 
caused).21  These concepts are geared toward human purposes.  
Our spatial thinking is geared toward “manipulating things,” 
our sense of time toward actions, our sense of causation toward 
assigning responsibility.22 
                                                          
 17. See PINKER, supra note 1, at 428. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id.  at 429–31. 
 22. Id. 
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One could make a case that our only innate concepts are 
the short list of basic concepts gleaned from the analysis of 
language, and that other concepts are constructed from those 
basic building blocks.  Just as plausibly, one could expand that 
list almost at will.  One could argue that concepts like “animal,” 
“vegetable,” and “mineral” are innate.  Categories within those 
concepts might be innate: perhaps evolution has equipped us 
with the concepts of “human,” “food animal,” and “predator.”  
For clarity, The Stuff of Thought takes on “Extreme 
Nativism”—the deliberately provocative idea that most of the 
concepts we have are innate.23 Under this theory, each word 
(with some exceptions, such as coined technical terms) would 
refer to an innate concept.  To take some at random, 
“marsupial,” “condominium,” and “zipper” would be innate 
concepts. 
The best argument for Extreme Nativism is the contention 
that words are not like molecules, but rather are like the 
ancient definition of atoms.  They cannot be broken down into 
more basic concepts.  “Father” means more than simply “male 
parent.”24 “Good” cannot be fully defined by using a set of more 
basic concepts.  If words cannot be broken down, the argument 
runs, then the concept for the word must be innate.25  That 
might seem ridiculous.  How could preliterate humans have the 
innate concept of, say, “sonnet”?  But the idea is plausible.  An 
analogy has been made to the immune system.26 The human 
body does not produce antibodies on demand for specific viruses 
and other intruders.  Rather, biologists have learned that the 
body produces untold variations of antibodies.  When a new 
hazard appears in the body, then an antibody may already 
exist to match it.  The brain may produce great numbers of 
concepts that wait until they are useful.27 
The Stuff of Thought undercuts this theory with several 
counter-strokes, not so much to defeat the facile but far-fetched 
argument, but to illuminate how study of language may 
indirectly reveal aspects of human nature.  One argument that 
most concepts are innate is that we seem to handle complex 
                                                          
 23. Id.  at 92–107 (discussing JERRY FODOR, THE LANGUAGE OF THOUGHT 
(1975)). 
 24. Id.  at 94. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id.  at 96. 
 27. Id. 
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concepts as easily as simple ones.28 A single word can denote a 
broad, simple concept (“food”) or a more specific and complex 
one (“vitamin”).  But psychologists have shown that complex 
concepts are indeed more difficult to learn.  In experiments, 
young children found it easier to act out concepts like “give” 
and “take” than more complex ones like “buy” and “sell” (buying 
involves both giving and taking).29  People do readily use 
complex concepts as fluidly as simple ones, but that arises 
through “chunking.” Once someone has learned a more complex 
concept, it can be treated as a single chunk and readily used.30 
We use “buy” as easily as “give” because it has become a single, 
chunked concept.  In this section, as throughout the book, the 
discussion of cognition lends itself quickly to law.  Law school, 
in large part, consists of assembling chunked concepts.  A tort, 
like battery, is composed of several elements, each of which 
breaks down into sub-elements.  After enough practice, 
students and lawyers use “battery” as fluidly as “give.” Law 
school exams (and the bar exam) are typically specialized 
reading comprehension tests, where the examinee reads some 
text and spots the application of learned concepts. 
Close analysis of verbs also helps refute the “atomic” 
theory of concepts, the view that words represent concepts that 
cannot be broken into components.  Verbs divide into classes 
that share common concepts, reflected by which constructions 
speakers of a language use.  In English, one might say “I hit 
the bat against the wall” or “I hit the wall with the bat.” 
However, one might say, “I cut the rope with the knife,” but not 
“I cut the knife against the rope.”31 “Cut,” unlike “hit,” entails 
the concept of effect (to cause a cut).  The Stuff of Thought gives 
examples of four verbs with different sets of concepts (each of 





Hit Motion, contact 
                                                          
 28. Id.  at 94–95. 
 29. Id.  at 100 (discussing Deirde Genner, Evidence for the Psychological 
Reality of Semantic Components: The Verbs of Possession, in EXPLORATIONS IN 
COGNITION (D.A.  Norman & D.E.  Rumelhart eds., 1975)). 
 30. Id.  at 100. 
 31. Id.  at 104 (relying on BETH LEVIN, ENGLISH VERB CLASSES AND 
ALTERATIONS: A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION (1993)). 
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Regular usage permits each verb to be used only in certain 
constructions—and that set of constructions is similar for verbs 
triggering with the same set of concepts.  So verbs are split into 
“crisscrossing microclasses” by concepts like motion, contact, 
and effect.33  Note here that courts have made similar 
distinctions in interpreting language.34 
A related question about human cognition is whether we 
think in language; if someone speaks primarily Icelandic, 
whether her brain processes concepts by manipulating 
Icelandic words, or whether cognition occurs in some other 
medium, which one might call a “language of thought.”35  The 
Stuff of Thought makes the case that the language of thought 
must be different from the particular language that we speak.  
First, the Icelandic speaker learned Icelandic.  Prelinguistic 
infants are not unable to think.  If she thinks in Icelandic, what 
did she think in before she learned Icelandic?36  Second, 
experimental psychologists have shown that “human thoughts 
are stored in memory in a form that is far more abstract than 
sentences.”37 After reading a set of related sentences (such as 
“The tree was in the front yard.”), experimental subjects did 
poorly at looking at a set of sentences and distinguishing those 
they had seen from new but similar ones.  They also mistakenly 
thought they had read sentences that presented similar 
information in a composite form, by combining facts from the 
sentences.  But they did well at remembering the gist of the 
sentences.  This all suggests that the brain does not store the 
literal words so much as the meanings of sentences.38 Third, 
                                                          
 32. Id.  at 106. 
 33. Id.  at 106–07. 
 34. See, e.g., County Line Cheese Co.  v.  Lyng, 823 F.2d 1127, 1132 (7th 
Cir.  1987) (“The common meaning of the words ‘shipped to’ would seem to 
require that the shipper intend the milk to reach its natural destination, the 
tanks of the distributing plant.  To put it another way, the fact that the milk 
needn’t stay shipped does not mean that you don’t have to ship it in the first 
place.”). 
 35. PINKER, supra note 1, at 125. 
 36. Id.  at 148–49. 
 37. Id.  at 149. 
 38. Id.  (discussing J.D.  Bransford & J.J.  Franks, The Abstraction of 
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language does not appear to limit our thinking.  People readily 
create new words, new meanings for old words, and new 
metaphorical uses for old words.39 
A similar, and telling, argument against the brain running 
on language alone is that “language itself is so badly suited as a 
medium of reasoning.”40  Heresy about the limits of language 
coming from a book about language, written solely in language, 
read in language? However, humans never rely on language 
alone.  That would be impossible, given the many meanings 
that a single word often has, the vagueness of literal meaning, 
and the manifold limits of language to describe many features 
of experience.  Rather, humans readily understand language in 
context, relying on many other types of information to interpret 
communication.41 Polysemy provides a nice example.42  A word 
often has several distinct meanings, which people readily 
distinguish in communication.  A single sentence often uses the 
same word or name in different senses: “The Boston Globe 
decided to change its size and typeface” uses “The Boston 
Globe” in the senses of an organization and an object.43 
Lawyers use “case” in many senses: printed judicial opinions, 
pending disputes in court, fictional sets of facts for discussion.  
If people thought only in words, all the other non-verbal 
information they have would be unavailable in interpreting 
language—but they rely on it constantly. 
Two linguistic concepts, polysemy and verb classes, prove 
formidable obstacles to another view of word meaning, what 
The Stuff of Thought terms “Radical Pragmatics.” Far from the 
idea that every word represents an innate concept, Radical 
Pragmatics proposes that words can have a different meaning 
on every occasion.44  In this view, people use words in so many 
different ways, making a word’s meaning so dependent on 
context, that meaning is really just a function of pragmatics, 
“how language is used in context in light of the knowledge and 
expectations of the conversants.”45  This would explain how a 
waitress referring to “the ham sandwich” can be referring to 
                                                          
Linguistic Ideas, 2 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.  331 (1971)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id.  at 150. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id.  at 108–09. 
 43. Id.  at 109–10. 
 44. Id.  at 107–09. 
 45. Id.  at 108 (discussing a number of papers in linguistics). 
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the human at the table that ordered a ham sandwich.46  It 
allows for the constant figurative, sarcastic, and metaphorical 
use of language in both literature and everyday speech.  This 
view resonates with lawyers.  Lawyers readily redefine words 
(as in contracts, patent claims, and statutes).  Critical Legal 
Studies is often associated with the view of indeterminacy of 
meaning, which suggests that interpretation of words and 
concepts is never constrained by the text. 
Polysemy could support Radical Pragmatics.  If a word can 
encompass many different meanings, the argument runs, then 
the word has no core meaning.  But close study of polysemy 
suggests that word meaning is more stable.  Research indicates 
that the various meanings a word can have are not improvised 
on each occasion, but rather learned.47  Similarly, frequently 
used words tend to have more meanings, which are regularly 
used according to convention.48 Laboratory experiments 
indicate that separate meanings of a word are stored separately 
in the brain.49 
Verb classification indicates that words have conventional 
meanings, as opposed to completely depending on context of 
use.  Speakers of a language regularly avoid uses that conflict 
with the conventional classification.50 Verbs follow a few basic 
categories (such as causation, motion, and contact) while 
ignoring the many other ways to characterize an event.51 So the 
logical structure underlying classification of verbs is regular 
and sophisticated, not the ad hoc approach that would create 
meaning from each communication in context. 
The downfall of Radical Pragmatics does not necessarily 
dispel theories of legal indeterminism.  Words likely have a 
core of conventional meaning, but legal interpretation looks to 
the meaning of sentences and cases.  Whether those assemblies 
of many words have a conventional meaning is a more complex 
question.  Still, The Stuff of Thought’s analysis does narrow the 
                                                          
 46. Id.  at 112. 
 47. Id.  at 115. 
 48. Id.  at 115 (citing R.H.  Baayen & F.  Moscoso del Prado Martin, 
Semantic Density and Past-Tense Formation in Three Germanic Languages, 81 
LANGUAGE 666 (2005)). 
 49. Id.  at 115 (discussing Devrah Klein & Gregory Murphy, The 
Representation of Polysemous Words, 45 J.  MEMORY & LANGUAGE 259 (2001)). 
 50. Id.  at 112. 
 51. Id.  at 112–13. 
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scope of indeterminacy in language. 
“BECAUSE” – OUR INTUITIVE SENSE OF CAUSATION 
Lawyers, and law students even more, deal with many 
conundrums of causation.52 In torts, we ask how far a chain of 
causation can extend before we say that the unreasonable 
person’s negligence did not cause the plaintiff’s injury.  In 
criminal law, a classic question is, where two people happen to 
shoot someone at the same time, whether either, both, or 
neither “caused” the injury.  In contracts, only some sorts of 
financial loss are deemed “caused” by breach of contract.  
Courts over centuries have struggled unsuccessfully to define 
and apply clear concepts of causation.  For policy reasons, 
courts have even held that a defendant caused injury by selling 
a dangerous pharmaceutical, even if the plaintiff may have 
been harmed by the same pharmaceutical sold by others.53 
The Stuff of Thought does not supply a theory of causation 
from cognitive science.  Indeed, science generally has become 
more cautious about speaking in terms of causes.  The Stuff of 
Thought does offer lawyers something useful: a description, 
drawn from the study of language, of how we seem to 
inherently view causation, which might be summed up as 
“Oomph.”54 
The Stuff of Thought first examines jurisprudential and 
philosophical attempts to define causation, running a gamut of 
perspectives from Hume through Kant to possible worlds and 
neural networks.55 Hume faulted our sense of causation as 
being mere correlation: if thunder follows lightning, we infer 
that lightning caused thunder.  But, as Hume himself wrote, 
our sense of causation goes beyond that: correlation does not 
always show causation, and events often have more than one 
cause.56  A more accurate description of our sense of causation 
is the counterfactual theory: lightning causes thunder if 
thunder would not occur without lightning.57 Lawyers have 
                                                          
 52. See generally Richard W.  Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL.  L.  
REV.  1735, 1740 (1985) (presenting “a systematic critique of these various 
accounts of the causation requirement in tort law”). 
 53. See generally Mark A.  Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative 
Liability and Market-Share Liability, 155 U.  PA.  L.  REV.  447 (2006). 
 54. PINKER, supra note 1, at 208. 
 55. Id.  at 208–18. 
 56. Id.  at 209–10. 
 57. Id.  at 211. 
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long recognized this approach, usually calling it but-for 
causation.  As lawyers have learned, though, the counterfactual 
approach runs into several intractable problems.  The greatest 
is that it is not always possible to change one event and then 
compare the hypothetical world that results.  We cannot just 
say all things being equal, except for surgically changing one 
fact.58  Events are too interdependent to truly do that.  The 
Stuff of Thought cites a philosophical formulation of causation: 
that “A causes B” means “B does not occur in the possible 
worlds closest to ours in which A does not occur.”59  That 
formulation elegantly captures the idea of but-for causation, 
but leaves the basic problems unresolved. 
Language appears to reflect an intuitive theory of 
causation.60  Verbs reflect several different types of causation: 
pure causation (such as “begin,” “cause,” “produce”), causing a 
specific effect (such as “melt,” “move,” “roll”), preventing 
(“avoid,” “thwart”), and enabling (“assist,” “help”).61  Other 
words imply a causal connection (such as “but,” “despite”).62  
Linguists account for that with a “mental model of ‘force 
dynamics.’”63  This model supposes an agonist, with a tendency 
toward motion or rest, and an antagonist, exerting force on the 
agonist, which may or may not be sufficient to change the 
agonist’s state.64  This yields four possibilities: causation 
(antagonist keeps rest-tending agonist moving), preventing 
(antagonist keeps motion-tending agonist in place), “movement 
despite a hindrance” (motion-tending agonist keeps going 
despite force from antagonist) and “stability despite a push” 
(rest-tending agonist remains in place despite force from 
antagonist).65  Verbs may also distinguish whether the 
antagonist’s actions have a defined endpoint (distinguishing 
blocking and allowing) and whether the verb includes the effect 
(such as “break”).66 
                                                          
 58. Id.  at 212. 
 59. Id.  at 213. 
 60. Id.  at 219. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See id.  at 219, (discussing Leonard Talmy, Force Dynamics in 
Language and Cognition, 12 COGNITIVE SCI.  49 (1988)). 
 64. Id.  at 219–20. 
 65. Id.  at 220. 
     66.    Id.  at 220–21. 
GRAHAM.MCJOHN.WEB 2/20/2009  12:00:29 PM 
2009] COGNITION, LAW, STORIES 267 
Our moral intuitions may follow these linguistic 
distinctions.  The Stuff of Thought cites the notable “trolley 
problem,” where logically equivalent events are evaluated 
differently, apparently on the distinction between causing and 
enabling.67  A trolley rolls down a railroad track toward a fatal 
collision with five workers.  The question is whether a 
bystander should flip a switch to send it onto a side track, 
where it will kill just one worker. Most people respond that 
they would pull the switch.  In another version, the only way to 
save the five workers is to throw a large man in front of the 
trolley.  Most people respond that they would not throw the 
man.  The difference in moral intuitions could arise from 
different force dynamics, suggesting that actively causing the 
death of one person by throwing a man is less blameworthy 
than enabling the train, by flipping the switch, to cause the 
death of one person.68 
Linguistics also suggests that causation plays another key 
role in cognition.  Cognitive semantics suggests that “the mind 
understands every entity in terms of four causes: who or what 
brought it about; what it’s made of; what shape it has; and 
what it’s for.”69  Word meanings regularly use these 
distinctions.  In the phrase, a “good road,” the adjective “good” 
modifies “road” as to the sense of what it is for (driving on).70  
The verb “began” in “she began the book” hooks onto the “what 
it’s for” component of book (books are to be read), not what the 
book is made of, or shaped like, or its origin.71  Others of the 
four causes are hooks for other words.  Polysemy again provides 
clear examples.  When “a count noun is used as a mass noun 
(as in There was sausage all over his shirt),” the meaning 
depends on what the sausage is made of.72 The sentence means 
not that one sausage (as in a count noun) is all over his shirt, 
rather that a mass of sausage was all over his shirt.  In another 
type of polysemy, the noun for the origin of something may be 
used for the thing itself (as in the New York Times for the 
organization that produced the object, a newspaper—or vice 
                                                          
 67. Id.  at 229–30. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id.  at 116 (citing JAMES PUSTEJOVSKY, THE GENERATIVE LEXICON 
(1995)). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
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It would be an interesting project to see how legal 
reasoning follows the lines of those four causes.  “Who or what 
brought it about” is key to many legal concepts.  The origins of 
a rule, a contract or other legal entity often play a large role in 
its treatment.  “What it’s for” is part and parcel of any legal 
analysis.  Rules, agreements, and communications are 
interpreted in light of the underlying public policy, transaction, 
or purpose.  Less obvious are “what it’s made of”74 and “what 
shape it has.”  Lawyers do speak of the law’s physical 
properties (as in, “a flexible standard”) and its shape: the scope 
of a rule, the breadth of a decision, a gap or loophole in the law, 
the extent of patent protection.  The Supreme Court held that 
the constitutionality of copyright legislation may depend on 
whether it fits the “traditional contours of copyright 
protection.”75 Whether that spatial terminology affects 
jurisprudence, or just provides a convenient trope, goes to the 
next topic: the power of metaphor. 
METAPHOR IN LAW AND LINGUISTICS 
The Stuff of Thought addresses a question that has 
increasingly occupied legal discourse, especially intellectual 
property: the extent to which human thinking is controlled by 
metaphors.76  Some cognitive linguists hold that metaphors 
determine how we think: “Our ordinary conceptual system, in 
terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally 
metaphorical in nature.”77  Under this view, human thinking—
from everyday life to politics to science—is governed by the 
conceptual metaphors of the parties.  The thinking of those on 
                                                          
 73. Id. 
 74. One example is the oft-quoted sayings attributed to Otto von 
Bismarck, “There are two things you don’t want to see being made—sausage 
and legislation.” 
 75. Eldred v.  Ashcroft, 537 U.S.  186, 221 (2003). 
 76. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Note, Regulation by Software, 114 
YALE L.J.  1719, 1727 (2005) (questioning the “spatial metaphor” that equates 
software with architecture for legal purposes: the view that “[j]ust as the set of 
things we can physically do in physical spaces is determined by their physical 
architecture, the set of things we can virtually do in virtual spaces is 
determined by their virtual architecture—that is, by the software programs 
that create these spaces”). 
 77. PINKER, supra note 1, at 245 (quoting GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK 
JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY 3 (1980)). 
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the political right is dominated by the metaphor of the 
government as a strict parent; the thinking of those on the 
political left is dominated by the metaphor of the government 
as a nurturing parent.78  In philosophy, if metaphors rule, 
Cartesianism rests on the metaphor “knowing is seeing,” Locke 
on “the mind is a container.”79  To change someone’s view, 
reasoned argument will never be sufficient.  Rather, 
supplanting the metaphor that controls their thinking on the 
subject is required. 
Arguments in law and politics often feature competing 
metaphors or arguments about the best way to apply a 
metaphor.  One battleground in recent years involves using the 
term “intellectual property,” to encompass such areas of law as 
copyright, patent, trademark, and trade secret.80  To put it in 
broad terms, those favoring broad rights in those areas and 
those favoring limited rights (meaning, broad rights of others to 
use the information in question) have often treated the very 
concept of “intellectual property” as controlling.  Proponents of 
strong protection argue that intellectual property should be 
treated just like other types of property: the owner should have 
strong rights to exclude others, the duration of protection 
should be long, and infringement should be broadly defined.  
Proponents of limits on protection have sometimes reacted by 
striking at the very term, stating that we should speak of 
copyrights, patents, and trademarks individually, and not lump 
them into a single term, “intellectual property,” which brings 
with it a host of concepts more suited to the house and garden.  
Other metaphors have been brought to bear, like “pirates,” 
“trolls,” and “information wants to be free.”  If the strong view 
of metaphorical thinking is right, then the words in which the 
debate is conducted will control the outcome.81  A related 
question arises with respect to the law governing computer 
                                                          
 78. Id.  at 246. 
 79. Id.  at 245–46. 
 80. Michael Madison, Comment, Where Does Creativity Come From? and 
Other Stories of Copyright, 53 CASE W.  RES.  L.  REV.  747, 763–64 (2003). 
 81. Cf.  A.  Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor Is the Key: Cryptography, the 
Clipper Chip, and the Constitution, 143 U.  PA.  L.  REV.  709, 718 (1995) (“The 
courts, and to a lesser extent the legislative and executive branches, have yet 
to come to grips with many cryptographic conundrums.  As a result, this part 
of the legal ‘landscape’ remains relatively barren.  As more and more settlers 
arrive in cyberspace, the nature of this new landscape will depend critically on 
the legal metaphors that the colonists choose to bring with them.”). 
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networks.82  If metaphor controls, then using terms like 
“cyberspace law,” and treating the Internet as a place, will 
govern how the law develops in that area.83  Commentators  
have suggested competing metaphors, such as a river, a 
highway,84 the development of the American frontier, or feudal 
economies.85 
The Stuff of Thought, here as with many issues, fashions a 
convincing middle-ground.  Metaphors play a role in thinking, 
and can be powerful tools.  But the position that thought is 
simply a competition between metaphors, as opposed to 
knowledge corresponding to objective truth, is subject to 
several objections.  For one thing, “our best science and 
mathematics can predict how the world will behave in ways 
that would be a staggering coincidence if the theories did not 
characterize reality.”86  A second telling objection is that the 
metaphors-control-thinking argument must apply to itself.  But 
it proposes an objective truth, that thinking is controlled by 
metaphors.87  So it becomes a counterexample to its own 
argument.  This move is convincing in this context and a good 
argument to remember with respect to other arguments that 
tend toward pure relativism.  The strong version of legal 
indeterminacy would undermine itself, if words were too 
                                                          
 82. See, e.g., Dan L.  Burk, The Trouble with Trespass, 4 J.  SMALL & 
EMERGING BUS.  L.  27 (2000). 
 83. A number of legal scholars have analyzed the interplay between the 
cyberspace metaphor and legal reasoning.  See Julie E.  Cohen, Cyberspace 
as/and Space, 107 COLUM.  L.  REV.  210 (2007); Dan Hunter, Cyberspace as 
Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CAL.  L.  REV.  439, 442 
(2003) (“This Article explains how the CYBERSPACE AS PLACE metaphor 
leads to undesirable private control of the previously commons-like Internet 
and the emergence of a digital anticommons.”); Mark A.  Lemley, Place and 
Cyberspace, 91 CAL.  L.  REV.  521 (2003); Jacqueline Lipton, Mixed Metaphors 
in Cyberspace: Property in Information and Information Systems, 35 LOY.  U.  
CHI.  L.J.  235 (2003); Michael J.  Madison, Rights of Access and the Shape of 
the Internet, 44 B.C.  L.  REV.  433, 437 (2003) (arguing that “the Internet-as-
place metaphor” should look to the user’s embodied experience, not formalist 
property law doctrine); Maureen O’Rourke, Property Rights and Competition 
on the Internet: In Search of an Appropriate Analogy, 16 BERKELEY TECH L.J.  
561 (2001); see also Stephanie A.  Gore, “A Rose by Any Other Name”: Judicial 
Metaphors for New Technologies, 2003 U.  ILL.  J.L.  TECH.  & POL’Y 403 (2003). 
 84. Richard A.  Epstein, Intel v.  Hamidi: The Role of Self-Help in 
Cyberspace?, 1 J.L.  ECON.  & POL’Y 147, 159 (2005). 
 85. See Alfred C.  Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors 
and Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 BERKELEY TECH.  L.  J.  1207, 1207 (2002). 
 86. PINKER, supra note 1, at 247. 
 87. Id.  at 247–48. 
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indeterminate to express a specific theory of indeterminacy. 
Taking the argument from the other direction, “people 
could not analyze their metaphors if they didn’t command an 
underlying medium of thought that is more abstract than the 
metaphors themselves.”88  In addition, people routinely ignore 
the irrelevant aspect of  metaphors, and may ignore the 
metaphorical aspect of an expression so much that they mix 
metaphors, such as Hamlet’s “to take arms against a sea of 
troubles” or the less familiar “once you open a can of worms, 
they always come home to roost.”89 
Metaphors may not control thought, but they play 
important roles.  People can learn new ideas by transferring 
the structure of familiar ones: thinking of the atom as a solar 
system or an antibody like the key to a lock.90  Novel metaphors 
have helped scientists solve problems and create new theories.  
The most famous might be Einstein’s thoughts about passing 
trains or passengers on a beam of light, which helped him 
conceive relativity.  But none of those metaphors control 
thought on those subjects.  An atom need not have a Pluto.  
Rather, metaphors can provide a means for manipulating 
concepts where the words do not already exist.  A new scientific 
discovery can be named with existing words, used in a 
metaphorical sense.91  Metaphors can also help organize and 
search the vast amount of information that people experience.  
Similarity seems to be key to recall, as when aspects of an 
event remind us of something else.92 Metaphors can express 
ideas and feelings that literal language cannot reach, as in the 
metaphors in fiction and poetry.93 The Stuff of Thought quotes 
Flaubert’s metaphor on the limits of language: “language is a 
cracked kettle on which we beat out tunes for bears to dance to, 
while all the time we long to move the stars to pity.”94 
The developing story of the intellectual property and 
cyberspace metaphors bears out the view in The Stuff of 
Thought.  The term “intellectual property” has become more 
common and such rights have increased (although decreasing 
                                                          
 88. Id.  at 249. 
 89. Id.  at 239. 
 90. Id.  at 241. 
 91. Id.  at 257. 
 92. Id.  at 275. 
 93. Id.  at 276–77. 
 94. Id.  at 278 (quoting GUSTAVE FLAUBERT, Madame Bovary: Life in a 
Country Town 173 (G.  Hopkins trans., Oxford University Press 1998) (1857)). 
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in some aspects), but more so due to political than literary 
power.  Congress has taken some measures that add to the pile 
of intellectual property, such as extending the term of 
copyrights,95 strengthening patent protection for biotech 
companies,96 and making it easier to prove trademark 
dilution.97 Such legislative expansion, however, was responsive 
to lobbying by the respective industries, although the 
surrounding debate certainly featured many metaphors on both 
sides.98 Analysis of the case law shows that judges have 
recognized the cyberspace-as-place metaphor without being 
constrained by it and have regularly probed the relevant 
underlying policy issues.99 Judges, like people generally, 
readily peel away intellectual property metaphors: “Even if we 
follow Gypsum’s hypostatization and treat the trade secret, a 
concept, like an object, theft is not the correct analogy.”100 The 
distinctions between real property and intellectual property 
readily have been unearthed.101  Meanwhile, the Supreme 
Court has pared back on intellectual property, a return of the 
                                                          
 95. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub.  L.  No.  105-298, 
112 Stat.  2827 (1998) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). 
 96. See Cooperative Research and Technology Enhancement (CREATE) 
Act of 2004, Pub.  L.  No.  108-453, 118 Stat.  3596 (2004) (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
 97. See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub.  L.  No.  109–312, 
120 Stat.  1730 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). 
 98. See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, 126-45 (2001) 
(describing in detail copyright industries’ role in legislation increasing 
copyright protection). 
 99. David McGowan, The Trespass Trouble and the Metaphor Muddle, 1 
J.L.  ECON.  & POL’Y 109, 109 (2005) (analyzing case law and rejecting the 
claim that “metaphors such as ‘space’ or ‘place’ or ‘property’ cause judges to 
think of the Internet as similar to physical property, in which persons may 
stake private claims the law protects from encroachment.”); see also Lemley, 
supra note 83, at 523 (“While acknowledging the dangers of the 
CYBERSPACE AS PLACE metaphor and the fact that courts have already 
started down the wrong road, I suggest that courts and commentators who 
think seriously about the nature of the Internet still have ample room to make 
reasoned policy decisions.  Though metaphor can mislead us, we need not be 
its slaves”); Cohen, supra note 83 (discussing ability to consciously choose 
metaphor in legal discussion). 
 100. U.S.  Gypsum Co.  v.  Ins.  Co.  of N.  Am., 813 F.2d 856, 858 (7th Cir.  
1987). 
 101. See, e.g., Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, GEO.  
L.J.  (forthcoming 2008) (discussing the applicability of the common law 
servitude concept to intellectual property licensing). 
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pendulum familiar in the history of law.102  The attitudes of 
people toward intellectual property are best predicted by what 
they have at stake (or the stories they tell), rather than what 
metaphors they have heard.103 The metaphors of property serve 
more as focal points than controls. 
LAW AND INDIRECT SPEECH – HOW LEGAL RULES CAN 
CREATE EFFICIENT NORMS 
Another area where cognitive linguistics could shine light 
on the role of law is indirect speech.  The Stuff of Thought uses 
some game theory to fit the logic of communication to the 
reality of human relationships.  Logician Paul Grice formulated 
several well-known maxims of conversation: Quantity (say no 
less or more than the conversation requires); Quality (do not 
say that which is false or unsupported); Manner (do not be 
obscure, ambiguous, wordy, or disorderly); Relevance (be 
relevant).104 Grice’s maxims effectively capture guidelines 
people generally follow.  We quickly note if a speaker speaks 
too much, or falsely, or is difficult to understand, or strays from 
the topic.  We also use departures from the maxims as signals 
to listeners of something beyond the literal meaning: sarcasm 
(as by damning by faint praise), wordplay (such as using 
ambiguity or obscurity for humorous effect), or changing the 
topic, or introducing the irrelevant  (to signal the present topic 
is touchy).105 
The Stuff of Thought discusses a specific way in which 
people deliberately communicate inefficiently: indirect speech.  
An example is the offer of a bribe to a traffic officer.106  A 
straightforward offer might be accepted—or raise the stakes 
from a traffic ticket to an arrest for attempted bribery.  An 
ambiguous offer (a suggestively placed fifty-dollar bill, along 
with a vague statement) violates the maxim of Manner.  But it 
                                                          
 102. See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co.  v.  Teleflex Inc., 127 S.  Ct.  1727, 1742 (2007) 
(raising obviousness standard for obtaining patent protection); eBay Inc.  v.  
MercExchange, 547 U.S.  388, 388 (2006) (raising standard for obtaining 
injunctions against patent infringement). 
 103. Cf.  Michael J.  Madison, The Narratives of Cyberspace Law (or, 
Learning from Casablanca), 27 COLUM.  J.L.  & ARTS 249, 254-55 (2004) 
(suggesting wryly that legal scholars should pay more attention to narrative 
than metaphors in thinking about the legal regimes applicable to the 
Internet). 
 104. PINKER, supra note 1, at 377. 
 105. Id.  at 378–79. 
 106. Id.  at 393. 
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is superior strategy—because it should yield acceptance by a 
corrupt officer, but not arrest by an honest one.  Such 
deliberate fuzziness of communication is so common that it has 
many names: well-established words like tact and hypocrisy, to 
newer coinages like “plausible deniability,”  for vague or secret 
communications that can later be effectively denied.  Rather 
than departures from the norm, as the Maxims might suggest, 
this reflects a more accurate description of how people 
communicate.  The Maxims framework suggests that people 
follow a principle of cooperation, seeking to convey information 
as efficiently and accurately as possible, a framework that one 
might expect from a logician.107 But people’s interactions are 
often partly cooperative and partly conflicting.  In addition, 
people often want to transfer some information while avoiding 
communicating other information.  Any commercial transaction 
has cooperative elements (if both parties would gain from 
exchange) and conflict (the price, the warranties, the allocation 
of various risks).  Social interactions have elements of conflict 
and cooperation, if more intangible. 
Indirect speech is often used, as The Stuff of Thought 
shows, to avoid communicating a particular category of 
information: information about the information that people 
know.  With a deftly offered bribe, the recipient will know that 
money is there for the taking, but will not know (or be able to 
show) that a bribe is being offered.  The same can hold for an 
infinite variety of interactions.  The Stuff of Thought gives 
examples of special interest campaign contributions (where no 
quid pro quo is specifically requested),108 romantic overtures,109 
and extortionate threats.110 In each setting, an offer can be 
made indirectly and indefinitely, so that each party does not 
know what the other party knows.  A similar dynamic leads to 
the oft-noted inanity of common polite phrases.  At a dinner 
among strangers, one might not directly request the salt to be 
passed, but more vaguely say, “Is there any salt down there?” 
As in the other examples, it communicates the possibility of a 
transfer but without a direct request—or order. 
We pay the price of muddy communication to protect social 
relationships.  Following the categories commonly utilized by 
                                                          
 107. Id.  at 376–77. 
 108. See id.  at 396. 
 109. Id.  at 412. 
 110. Id.  at 413–14. 
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anthropologists, The Stuff of Thought divides social 
relationships into Communality (symmetric relationships with 
sharing, as within families), Authority Ranking (asymmetric 
relationships, where one party has superior status, jealously 
guarded, and conveys authority over others), and Equality 
Matching (symmetric exchange relationships where  fair social 
exchange of goods or services makes both parties better off).111 
Indirect speech can allow interactions to go through without 
threatening existing relationships.  A “whimperative” like “Is 
there any salt down there?” allows a diner to get the salt, 
without treating the others as inferiors—so it maintains a 
Communal or Equality Sharing relationship, and makes clear 
that the diner just hopes for the salt, not to claim a position of 
Authority.112  Conversely, an ambiguous threat uses indirect 
speech to maintain Authority: because the threat is ambiguous, 
the speaker need not follow through if denied (which could be 
costly and dangerous) but does not suffer the loss of face, and 
therefore loss of Authority, that backing down would entail.113 
A superior could make an ambiguous threat, saying that if the 
work was not done properly, she would not be happy. 
In many of these settings, indirect speech is used to 
prevent mutual knowledge from becoming common 
knowledge.114 The Stuff of Thought illustrates the difference 
between mutual knowledge and common knowledge with the 
tale of the Emperor’s New Clothes.  Everyone at the procession 
could see that the Emperor wore no clothes, but no one could be 
sure that the others knew that because they were all playing 
along.  But when the child shouted, “The emperor has no 
clothes!” and everyone laughed, the mutual knowledge became 
common knowledge.  Each person knew the emperor was 
unclothed, and more importantly, knew that the others knew 
that the emperor was unclothed, and knew that the others 
knew that the others knew that the emperor was unclothed 
(and so on).115 
Common knowledge depends on recursion, “a formula that 
contains an example of itself.”116 Numbers are recursive.  The 
Nth integer is simply the (N-1)th integer plus one.  Likewise, 
                                                          
 111. Id.  at 400–10. 
 112. Id.  at 388. 
 113. Id.  at 413–14. 
 114. Id.  at 418–22. 
 115. Id.  at 419. 
 116. Id.  at 421. 
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common knowledge can be framed in such self-referential 
terms: People know y, and y is defined as “[e]veryone knows x 
and everyone knows y.”117 Defining a formula in terms of itself 
seems to hazard circular reasoning.  Playing on this, the Jargon 
File defines recursion as follows: “recursion: n.: See 
recursion.”118 But as long as the return has a termination point 
(e.g., one person knows that the emperor has no clothes), 
recursive formulas have great generative power.  They figure 
prominently in mathematics and computer science.119 Noam 
Chomsky’s linguistics, a landmark in cognitive science, rest on 
a recursive formula for sentence structure.120 Some language 
scientists regard recursion as fundamental to human cognition: 
Recursive ability is uniquely human and affects more than just our 
language, but most of our behaviour .  .  .  .   For example, in a 
classroom we often see child A watch child B watch child C watch the 
teacher.  But in chimps, we see chimp A watch its mother, chimp B 
watch its mother, chimp C watch its mother .  .  .121 
If human cognition takes into account the mental state of 
others, and chimp cognition does not, humans have much 
greater tools for social structures.  Indirect speech prevents 
social disruptions and illustrates recursion, a key aspect of 
human cognition.  Does “Is there any salt down there?” have 
anything to tell us about the law? The law is at the other 
extreme from pretense of Communality through instinctive 
sharing, or Equality through matching equality.  The law 
speaks in terms of Authority and issues direct orders.  But 
                                                          
 117. Id. 
 118. Jargon File, Recursion, 
http://www.catb.org/jargon/html/R/recursion.html (last visited Oct.  26, 2008). 
 119. See Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 HARV.  L.  REV.  
1974, 2028 (2006) (“Today, thanks to networked information technology and 
the recursively generative code produced in large part by amateurs, art can be 
produced and shared by people other than professional artists, citizens can 
engage in far-ranging dialogues with others whom they would not otherwise 
encounter, and people can work together from the four corners of the globe to 
produce intellectual projects of social and economic significance.”). 
 120. See STEVEN PINKER, THE LANGUAGE INSTINCT 101 (1994). 
 121. Gaia Vince, Puzzled Monkeys Reveal Key Language Step, NEW 
SCIENTIST, Jan.  15, 2004, available at 
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn4572&print=true (quoting 
David Premack); see also W.  Tecumseh Fitch & Marc D.  Hauser, 
Computational Constraints on Syntactic Processing in a Nonhuman Primate, 
303 SCI.  377 (2004) (“The capacity to generate a limitless range of meaningful 
expressions from a finite set of elements differentiates human language from 
other animal communication systems.”). 
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some aspects of the law play the same role as whimperatives. 
The game theoretic mechanisms follow a similar 
progression from the refinements on Grice’s maxims.  Grice’s 
maxims were descriptors of the dynamics of conveying 
information in conversation, but their descriptive power was 
narrowed by their assumption of complete cooperation.  This is 
rather similar to what might be called first-generation law and 
economics.  Economic analysis of law typically saw legal rules 
as a response to market failures.  Contract law, for example, 
existed to minimize transaction costs.122 Transactions are 
generally beneficial.  If Buyer purchases Seller’s Mini Cooper, 
then both parties are better off, in their own estimation: Buyer 
preferred to have the Mini Cooper than to retain the price, and 
Seller preferred to have the price than to retain the Mini 
Cooper.  Exchange is good, but mutually beneficial exchanges 
may be obstructed or made more costly if parties have to 
negotiate to address every risk: if the Mini Cooper is defective, 
or is hit by lightning during shipping, or a necessary part goes 
out of production before the sale and these risks are 
incorporated into negotiations, then the price goes up.  
Contract law provides default rules to address all those 
contingencies, so the parties need only negotiate to the extent 
they want to customize the rules to their transactions (such as 
agreeing that one party bear the risk of a lightning strike).  So 
in deciding questions of contract law, the law and economics 
approach was to find the rule that the parties would have 
agreed upon, had they explicitly addressed it.  Like Grice, this 
approach assumes a cooperative approach.  In other areas, like 
torts and criminal law, economic analysis did not assume 
cooperation, but did make a parallel assumption of complete 
information.123 
Game theory, and the economics of information, brought a 
new approach—just as The Stuff of Thought used game theory 
to refine Grice’s maxims for a better description of human 
communication.  Some contract law rules were better seen as 
“information-forcing” defaults.  Under this approach, contract 
law would provide default rules not to fill the gaps for parties, 
                                                          
 122. See generally Jason Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the 
Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules, 100 YALE L.J.  615 (1990) 
(discussing and critiquing economic analysis of default rules). 
 123. See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167–245 
(Aspen Publishing 7th ed.  2007) (analyzing tort and criminal law rules, 
generally assuming complete information). 
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but to give them incentive to disclose information efficiently.124  
Game theory also provides economic support for a view that 
focuses on the expressive function of law.125 Rather than 
serving as a carrot or stick, the law can sometimes serve as a 
focal point to aid social coordination.  This expressive theory of 
law allows economic analysis of law to encompass social 
functions of law that had long been studied in other disciplines, 
such as sociology and anthropology. 
The discussion of indirect speech suggests a related 
function of law.  Just as indirect speech avoids disruption of 
social relationships, so law can allow parties to interact while 
avoiding relationship-threatening communications.  Contract 
law, in part, plays such a role in commercial life.  Negotiations 
for transactions can be hazardous.  As a great amount of 
literature shows, the dynamics of negotiations can result in 
mutually beneficial transactions falling through.  If one party 
feels that the other party is exerting too much authority, the 
party may walk away rather than comply.126 Contract law, by 
providing default rules that govern many contingencies, 
reduces the hazards of negotiation.127 In The Stuff of Thought 
terms, it allows the parties to maintain the form of an Equality 
relationship, rather than an Authority relationship. 
Family law can be viewed in a similar way with regard to 
Pinker’s social relationships.  Family relationships are 
Communality relationships, where the parties share freely.  
Even raising the question of the terms on which to share things 
may violate the principles of Communality.  Family law allows 
                                                          
 124. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: 
An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J.  87, 91 (1989). 
 125. See Richard H.  McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 
VA.  L.  REV.  1649, 1651 (2000) (arguing that “law provides a focal point 
around which individuals can coordinate their behavior.  When individuals 
have a common interest in coordinating, as frequently occurs, a legal rule may 
guide behavior merely by influencing expectations about how others will 
behave”); Richard H.  McAdams & Janice Nadler, Testing the Focal Point 
Theory of Legal Compliance: The Effect of Third-Party Expression in an 
Experimental Hawk/Dove Game, 2 J.  EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD.  87 (2005). 
 126. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to 
Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93 MICH.  L.  REV.  107, 143 
(1994) (stating people act based on their perception of treatment by others). 
 127. See Stephen M.  McJohn, Default Rules in Contract Law as Response 
to Status Competition in Negotiation, 31 SUFFOLK U.  L.  REV.  39, 40 (1997) 
(“The process of negotiation itself, however, may become a competition.  
Rather than simply trying to achieve their original goals, parties sometimes 
shift in whole or in part to ‘win’ the bargaining.”). 
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parties to avoid such discussions.  Parties can avoid questions 
of how to share family property, or to divide property among 
the survivors of a deceased family member, and especially such 
questions as how to allocate familial rights (not just property, 
but such core matters as custody of children).  In short, the law 
allows parties to avoid discussions that could threaten 
Communality relationships. 
A set of default legal rules also avoids mutual knowledge.  
Members of a family group, where the law supplies the rules, 
do not need to know whether the other family members know 
the content or even existence of those rules.  That allows all 
parties to proceed, if they wish, without broaching such 
possibilities as death, divorce, mental incompetence, and the 
other subjects of family law.  Parties to a possible contract need 
not mention such contingencies as breach, mistake, illegality—
or know whether the other parties know the governing legal 
rules.  Legal rules in other contexts likely play such a face-
saving role.  Some safety regulations allow individuals to adapt 
their behavior without conceding to mere social norms.  Where 
seat-belts and motorcycle helmets are not required, some 
people who would actually prefer to use the safety measure 
might forgo protection simply to maintain a certain social 
image or to avoid publicly conceding to social pressure.  Where 
the law changes to require protection, the individual can buckle 
up as though it were involuntary.  In other contexts, the 
mutual-knowledge blocking role of the law may hinder legal 
progress.  The conformity required by the law may prevent 
people from realizing the extent to which some others dislike 
the law.128 
Indirect speech provides a good example of how examining 
interactions from a cognitive perspective can throw light on the 
law’s effects.  Asking for the salt and drafting a statute can 
have some surprising similarities, because both go to the 
dynamics of social interactions.  People react not just to literal 
words, but the implications they have for the mental state of 
others.  Legal rules, like standards of politeness, allow people 
to conform their behavior to social norms without sacrificing 
status. 
                                                          
 128. Cf.  Cass R.  Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent (Univ.  Chi.  Law & 
Econ., Olin Working Paper No.  164, 2002), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=341880 (arguing that the majority of individuals 
conform to society, but when this occurs, society can make large mistakes). 
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STORIES IN LEGAL COGNITION 
Many of the cognitive science findings discussed in The 
Stuff of Thought are relevant to law.  It gives many examples 
from the law, such as the “conundrum” intellectual property 
poses for our intuitive sense of property as a thing,129 the ill fit 
between our sense of causation and legal questions (did 
Guiteau kill Garfield, where Garfield survived the shooting but 
not the following dubious medical treatment?),130 the match 
between our intuition that a state of being is involuntary (and 
therefore blameless) and the case law holding that status 
crimes are unconstitutional,131 and even an explanation for the 
prolixity of legalese in contracts: unlike most communication, a 
contract is “directed to an adversarial reader rather than a 
cooperative one.”132  Legal scholars have drawn increasingly on 
cognitive science concepts. 
Here we suggest adding another approach to the mix—
following literary theorists who have linked cognitive science 
with narrative theory.  As Mark Turner put it, “Story is a basic 
principle of mind.  Most of our experience, our knowledge, and 
our thinking are organized as stories.”133 We discuss here how 
focusing on the cognitive aspects of stories illuminates the 
cognitive tasks of law, such as reasoning, remembering, 
learning, persuading, and communicating.  The cognitive 
science concepts from The Stuff of Thought—chunking, 
recursion, causation as Oomph, the primary qualities of an 
object—play into a cognitive view of stories.  To make it more 
concrete, we turn to how a cognitive science view of stories 
could fit with recent legal scholarship. 
There is nothing new in saying that lawyers deal in 
stories.134 Trial lawyers compete to develop more appealing 
stories for the jury.  Appellate lawyers are told to hone a story 
for the panel of judges.135 Legal academia is increasingly open 
                                                          
 129. PINKER, supra note 1, at 85. 
 130. Id.  at 86-87. 
 131. Id.  at 207. 
 132. See id.  at 377–78. 
 133. MARK TURNER, THE LITERARY MIND, at v (1996). 
 134. See, e.g., Richard A.  Posner, Legal Narratology, 64 U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  
737,738-39 (1997) (discussing various ways stories figure in legal theory and 
practice). 
 135. Cf.  Kenneth Chestek, The Plot Thickens: The Appellate Brief as Story 
5 (Dec.  18, 2007) available at 
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to law as stories.  Legal theory has seen turns toward 
narrative, law-and-literature, and story-scholarship.136 Some 
scholars deliberately adopted story-telling as a form of 
scholarship to challenge the dogmas of mainstream legal 
scholarship.137 Even the form of the standard law review article 
has changed.  Increasingly, an article opens with an engaging 
story, as if to compensate the reader for the dozens of pages of 
footnoted legal analysis ahead.  It is so established that stories 
are a staple of law, but there could be fresh insights from the 
combination of narrative theory and cognitive science. 
Looking at the cognitive role of stories would broaden the 
usual perspective on legal reasoning.138 Most discussion of legal 
reasoning focuses on the justification for legal rules and 
decisions.  Thinking about stories helps bring into focus the 
many other cognitive tasks that the law requires, and also 
gives one a more accurate window into how legal decisions are 
made (as opposed to how they are justified).139 The law requires 
not only decision-making, but a range of other cognitive tasks 
such as learning, memory, persuasion, and the transferring of 
learned concepts.  Lawyers and law students are acutely aware 
of the considerable demands that law makes on learning and 
memory, but legal theory tends to take those tasks for granted, 
treating judicial decision-making as the principal object of 
study.  Even in considering judicial decision-making, legal 
                                                          
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998388) (discussing the 
parallels between appellate brief writing and fiction writing). 
 136. See Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW’S 
STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 2 (Peter Brooks & Paul 
Gewirtz eds., 1996); see also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and 
Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX.  L.  REV.  1929, 
1933 (1991) (“Could reading a well-written, deeply felt counternarrative save a 
judge from history’s condemnation in cases such as the ones we will discuss?”). 
 137. See generally Nancy L.  Cook, Outside the Tradition: Literature as 
Legal Scholarship, 63 U.  CIN.  L.  REV.  95 (1994); Daniel A.  Farber & 
Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 
45 STAN.  L.  REV.  807 (1993). 
 138. Cf.  Carol M.  Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game 
Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 Yale J.L.  & Human.  37 (1990); 
Stefan H.  Krieger, The Place of Storytelling in Legal Reasoning: Abraham 
Joshua Heschel’s Torah Min Hashamayim (Hofstra U.  Legal Studies 
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.  07-26, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1010930. 
 139. Cf.  William B.  Turner, Nietzsche, Foucault, Scalia 1 (Emory Sch.  of 
Law, Pub.  Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No.  
06-28, 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=948311 (exploring 
narrative strategies in Supreme Court opinions). 
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theory pays little attention to how (or whether) judges acquire 
the knowledge of the myriad cases and rules (let alone the mass 
of evidence that a single case may produce) that are pertinent 
to the decisions in cases. 
A story is almost an ideal data structure for human 
cognition.  Stories lend themselves to learning and memory, for 
several reasons.  A story is a linked sequence.  Once someone 
remembers one part of a story, one can then recall the next 
part—or work backwards.  Contrast that with other 
agglomerations of information, where knowing one part does 
not help with remembering the next.  Stories also have several 
levels of abstraction, as law recognizes—most notably in 
Learned Hand’s abstractions test for copyright infringement.140 
A story may be described in the sequence of words, a sequence 
of events, a sequence of scene, or an abstract summary.  There 
are also different abstract dimensions that can be analyzed: its 
plot, moral, or themes.  These levels of abstraction make stories 
helpful as cognitive units: in learning, in remembering, or in 
conveying information.141 
As a cognitive device, a story is also “robust.” This means 
that a portion of a story may be forgotten (or revised, or even 
misremembered) without doing too much harm to it as a whole.  
The rest of the story may still be remembered or learned or 
used for persuasion.  Compare this aspect of stories with other 
compilations of information.  A mathematical proof, for 
example, is much less robust, being so fragile that it can be 
rendered completely invalid if just one line is made invalid.  
Changing a key aspect of a story, of course, may change the 
                                                          
 140. Nichols v.  Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir.  1930) 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of 
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and 
more of the incident is left out.  The last may perhaps be no more 
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at 
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this series 
of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since otherwise 
the playwright could prevent the use of his ‘ideas,’ to which, apart 
from their expression, his property is never extended. 
 141. Since long before writing, stories have been central to the 
transmission of knowledge, as in transmitting traditional knowledge.  
GREGORY CAJETE, LOOK TO THE MOUNTAIN: AN ECOLOGY OF INDIGENOUS 
EDUCATION 68 (1994) (“Current research in the cognitive process is just 
beginning to investigate the metaphoric structures and inherent processes in 
stories and storytelling .  .  .  .  Story—in creative combination with 
encounters, experiences, image making, ritual, play, imagination, dream, and 
modeling—forms the basic foundation of all human learning and teaching.”). 
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meaning of the story—but that is a useful feature. 
Stories also convey emotive content effectively.  Cognitive 
science is increasingly recognizing the importance of emotions 
in cognition.  The emotive aspect of stories makes them easier 
to learn and remember, and also makes them more persuasive.  
This may not always be an advantage, since emotive aspects 
may affect decision-makers who are unaware or unwilling to 
admit being so affected.142 One must consider the role of 
emotions to understand how legal reasoning truly works. 
In order to view stories in cognitive terms, it is necessary 
to attempt to define “story.” Stories are used throughout every 
culture, and studied in many disciplines, and used by every 
profession, yet no one has concretely defined “story.” Perhaps 
the best known formulation holds that a story has a beginning, 
middle, and an end.  That serviceable definition, however, does 
not substantially advance our understanding of the cognitive 
role of stories.  Some have suggested looking to the verbal and 
sequential nature of stories: “A story can be described as a 
sequentially presented set of propositions, each using various 
types of verbal constructions to create different propositional 
frames.”143 We would suggest a formulation that fits with the 
cognitive role of stories—that a story is a connected sequence of 
events and stories.  This is hardly a rigorous definition, but it 
could prove useful in understanding how we think with stories.  
It seeks to define a story recursively, as being composed of 
stories, which in turn are composed of sequences of events. 
This recursive definition fits several aspects of stories.  It 
suggests that our ability to handle concepts recursively 
(important in other aspects of human cognition, such as 
language and inferring the mental states of other people) is 
used when we deal with stories.  It also allows stories to take 
on several levels of abstraction.  A story could be a short 
sequence of events, or a sequence of stories, or a sequence of 
sequences of stories—meaning that stories can be characterized 
at several levels of abstraction. 
A story, so defined, can function as what The Stuff of 
Thought calls a “chunk,” a single unit which can be 
manipulated or processed by the brain, just as concepts can be 
assembled into more complex concepts, which are then treated 
                                                          
 142. Cf.  Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact 
Statements, 63 U.  CHI.  L.  REV.  361, 392–93 (1996) (arguing that some stories 
should be excluded exactly because of the emotional power of narrative). 
 143. DAVID HERMAN, STORY LOGIC 44 (2002). 
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as a chunk.144 Stories can be readily compared, retrieved from 
memory, used for reasoning, and communications. 
The formula also conceives of stories as “connected” 
sequences of events and stories.  The word “connected” here 
plays a place holding role—or even a question-begging role.  
How events become connected to constitute stories is hardly 
settled.145  Our ability to tell, interpret, evaluate, and invent 
stories suggests that some sort of logic is at work—but the 
nature of that logic (or whether different types of stories have 
different logics) is something that requires more insight into 
cognition.  But it would seem likely that at least part of the 
glue holding stories together is our intuitive sense of causation, 
as discussed in The Stuff of Thought.  Other things governing 
the connection of stories would be our use of metaphor and 
analogy, by which one story has meaning for other stories (as in 
the case law method)—at various levels of abstraction. 
Another way to describe how the elements of stories 
become connected might be the form of inference Charles 
Sanders Peirce identified as “abduction.”146  Peirce divided 
reasoning into three categories.  The first two forms are 
familiar in discussions of reasoning: deductive reasoning, as in 
mathematical proofs or in the application of a categorical rule 
to a set of facts, and inductive reasoning, which applies 
observations about items to similar items.147  Peirce proposed 
that people must use a third form of reasoning, which he called 
“abduction.” Abduction takes information and forms likely 
explanations.148  Abduction would underlie a broad range of 
inferences, from formulation of scientific hypotheses to the 
many guesses we make to get through daily life.149  Peirce did 
not succeed in formulating a logic of abduction (unlike 
deduction, and to a lesser extent, induction).  Cognitive 
scientists and philosophers have relied on the concept, 
sometimes terming it “inference to the best explanation,” 
although just how people form explanations so readily remains 
                                                          
 144. See PINKER, supra note 1, at 100. 
 145. HERMAN, supra note 143, at 35. 
 146. See Stephen M.  McJohn, On Uberty: Legal Reasoning by Analogy and 
Peirce’s Theory of Abduction, 29 WILLAMETTE L.  REV.  191, 192–93 (1993). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id.  at 201. 
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an important area of study.150  But, both as a matter of logic 
and psychology, Peirce’s proposal carries a lot of explanatory 
force itself, because people do depend on forming likely 
explanations, where neither the iron laws of deduction nor the 
straightforward implication of induction would apply. 
A similar sort of reasoning pervades stories, which in order 
to satisfy our intuitive sense of narrative must make sense in a 
way that does not simply depend on the sort of reasoning in a 
mathematical proof.  Stories have many explanatory aspects, 
exemplified by the case-based reasoning key to legal reasoning.  
Events in a story may explain earlier events.  More broadly, a 
story is often used as a means of explanation.  Lawyers use 
stories to explain abstract ideas  like legal principles or policy 
considerations, or much more specific and concrete concepts, 
like the actions of a party in a case.151 
A cognitive view of stories fits well with the increasing 
attention to narrative theory in legal scholarship.  Silbey has 
explored the role of “origin stories” in the law, particularly as 
they related to the law of intellectual property.152 Origin 
stories—like the Biblical tale of the Garden of Eden, or the 
founding of Rome by Romulus and Remus—serve a number of 
cultural functions.153  Origin stories assign meaning to 
institutions, provide an explanation and justification of social 
arrangements, and support cultural unity through common 
belief.154 As Silbey shows, the law uses what might be called 
origin stories: legal rules are traced and given authority by 
their origin.155  Interpretation and application of legal rules 
often look to the original purpose of the rule.  Intellectual 
property law provides a special twist on origin stories, by 
assigning control of information to the author or inventor that 
originated information.156 
                                                          
 150. See, e.g., Gilbert Harman, The Inference to the Best Explanation, 74 
PHIL.  REV.  88 (1965). 
 151. Cf.  Dennis M.  Patterson, Law’s Pragmatism: Law as Practice & 
Narrative, 76 VA.  L.  REV.  937, 963–65 (1990). 
 152. See Jessica Silbey, The Mythical Beginnings of Intellectual Property, 
15 GEO.  MASON L.  REV 319 (2008). 
 153. Id.  at 324. 
 154. Id.  at 323–24. 
 155. Id.  at 326. 
 156. Turner, in his cognitive approach to stories, sees a similar thinking in 
such sayings as “brainchild” and “Necessity is the mother of invention.” 
TURNER, supra note 133, at 52 (“The extraordinary richness of the story of 
birth has made it perhaps the premier example of a familiar and powerful 
story that is projected onto other stories.”). 
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A cognitive view of stories complements this analysis.  As 
discussed above, a cognitive view suggests that “the mind 
understands every entity in terms of four causes: who or what 
brought it about; what it’s made of; what shape it has; and 
what it’s for.”157 An origin story can supply two of those basic 
causes: who brought about the legal concept, and what it is for.  
Any appellate decision or law review article is likely to feature 
a discussion of the origins of the relevant legal rule, and why it 
was created.  This is hardly objectionable, as a matter of legal 
reasoning.  But noting the cognitive slots that origin stories so 
neatly fit into can help us be aware of the cognitive blind spots 
they may foster.  Because an argument based on the original 
purpose of a rule can be so satisfying, it may be accepted when 
it deserves greater examination. 
Origin stories can fill many different functions, in law as 
elsewhere.  Sometimes the story supplies an explanation for the 
rule, sometimes it primarily serves as authority for the rule, 
sometimes it serves as cultural adhesive—or it could be any 
combination of these functions.  More broadly, this suggests 
that stories could be categorized for analysis of their cognitive 
aspects.158 
The cognitive approach would supplement other attempts 
to bring together law and literary theory.  Patent claims, for 
example, present a thorny problem that can be addressed in 
legal or linguistic terms.  A legal scholar and a literary scholar 
collaborated to suggest that patents could be studied from the 
perspective of “genre theory,” which takes into account the 
social action of texts, as interpreted by a community.159 This 
fits with the narrative approach to cognitive science.  As part of 
the attempt to analyze narrative as “a process of building and 
updating mental models about the worlds that are told about in 
                                                          
 157. PINKER, supra note 1, at 116. 
 158. Lawyers could craft stories by using an appropriate category for a 
particular type of advocacy.  Cf.  Ruth Anne Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby 
Slippers and Merlin: Telling the Client’s Story Using the Characters and 
Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 SEATTLE U.  L.  REV.  767, 768 
(2006) (focusing on “the relationship of mythology and folklore heroes to 
everyday lawyering decisions”). 
 159. See Presentation by Dan Burk & Jessica Reyman, Patents as Genre 
(2007), 
http://www.law.depaul.edu/centers_institutes/ciplit/ipsc/ppt/Jessica_ReymanP
PT.ppt#258, 3, Definition of Genre). 
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stories,”160 David Herman suggested the following typology of 
genre by preference for story types:161 
 
Genre Preference Rankings (by Event Type) 
 
Epic Accomplishments > achievements > 
activities > states 
News reports Achievements > accomplishments > 
activities > states 
Psychological 
novels  
States > activities > accomplishments > 
achievements 
Ghost stories   Activities > states > accomplishments > 
achievements 
 
Stories may be subject to conceptual classification as The 
Stuff of Thought classified verbs.  This suggests, for example, 
examining the many stories in reported legal cases, to see if 
different areas of law show preference for event rankings.  Tort 
cases could differ from contracts, and that different torts could 
vary—such as battery compared to intentional infliction of 
emotional distress. 
The idea that a story is a cognitive unit—that cognition 
relies on stories, analogous to how cognition relies on words, 
sentences, and metaphors—permits a broader view of the 
staple of legal reasoning, reasoning by analogy.162  Treating 
story as a cognitive unit has two effects on the role of metaphor.  
First, it supports the view in The Stuff of Thought that 
metaphor is central to our thinking, but not determinative.  
Stories, which use metaphor but also other cognitive devices, 
play an important, and less constraining, role in reasoning.  
Second, it provides a more dynamic view of analogical 
reasoning than a strong view of metaphor does.  Turner’s views 
on reasoning by analogy would provide a welcome insight into 
legal reasoning.  In cognitive science, as in discussions of legal 
reasoning, analogical reasoning is usually discussed as 
projecting inferences about a target to a source.163 The strong 
                                                          
 160. HERMAN, supra note 143, at 1. 
 161. Id.  at 37. 
 162. See generally Cass R.  Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV.  
L.  REV.  741 (1993). 
 163. MARK TURNER, COGNITIVE DIMENSIONS OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 123–24 
(2001). 
GRAHAM.MCJOHN.WEB 2/20/2009  12:00:29 PM 
288 MINN.  J.L.  SCI.  TECH. [Vol.  10:1 
 
 
view of metaphor treats metaphor as organizing our thinking 
about a matter, once the set of facts fall within the domain of 
the metaphor.  This views analogy as a relatively static process.  
Once similarities are detected between two cases, then aspects 
of the first are inferred to be true of the second.  However, 
Turner aptly observes that analogical reasoning is a more 
dynamic process.  Making an analogy is not so much a matter 
of discovering existing similarities, but rather an active process 
of reasoning dynamically, to forge an entire network of 
connections between two cases.164 In other words, making an 
analogy is like creating a story. 
A cognitive view of stories could complement other 
cognitive science approaches to decision-making.  A recent 
copyright case illustrates well a common disposition toward 
stories.  A jury determined that the defendant had infringed 
copyright by downloading some twenty-four songs to her 
computer without authority and placing them in the Kazaa 
folder on her computer, which made them available for 
download by other Kazaa users.165 The jury then awarded 
$222,000 in damages.166 Actual damages in the case were 
probably about $20,167 so the award of $222,000 ($9,250 per 
song) went far beyond compensating the copyright owners for 
their lost revenue.  The jurors, it seems, awarded such a 
massive amount because they felt that defendant lied to 
them.168 The defendant steadfastly denied downloading any 
                                                          
 164. Id.  at 124. 
 165. Jeff Leeds, Labels Win Suit Against Song Sharer, N.Y.  TIMES, Oct.  5, 
2007, at C1.  The legal theory that the defendant “distributed” the works 
simply by making them available to others by placing them in her Kazaa 
folder (without a showing that anyone downloaded the songs from her) 
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Thomas: The Key Appeal Issue, Oct.  9, 2007, 
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visited Oct.  26, 2008). 
 166. See von Lohmann, supra note 165. 
 167.   Eric Bangeman, Appeal in RIAA Case to Focus on 
“Unconstitutionally Excessive” Punishment, Oct.  15, 2007, 
http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20071015-appeal-in-riaa-case-to-focus-on-
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 168. Wired Blog Network, RIAA Juror: ‘We Wanted to Send a Message’, 
http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/10/riaa-juror-we-w.html (last visited 
Nov.  20, 2008)(“During a 45-minute telephone interview, Hegg said jurors 
found that Thomas’ defense—that she was the victim of a spoof—was 
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Hegg said.  ‘Spoofing? We’re thinking, ‘Oh my God, you got to be kidding .  .  .  
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songs, despite overwhelming evidence from user files, password 
use, online discussions, and other records.  She presented an 
implausible story to the jury, which reacted strongly.  Had 
defendant acknowledged the actions, and presented a defense 
on other grounds, such as fair use or no damages, the jury 
might have been less draconian.  All by way of illustrating a 
commonplace: people skillfully evaluate stories they hear and 
have strong reactions to stories deemed implausible.169 
We can take that insight into a much more high-tech 
analysis of moral decision-making.  Recall the trolley 
problem—a staple conundrum among contemporary moral 
theorists.  A trolley is rolling along the tracks on its way to 
killing five workers.  Most people say they would flip a switch 
that sends the trolley onto another track, even if that would kill 
a worker there, since it is better to let one die rather than five.  
However, most people say that even if the only way to save the 
five workers would be to throw a large man in front of the 
trolley they would not do it.  These questions have been posed 
to people while their brains were being imaged with fMRI.170 
The results suggest that the logical considerations were 
overcome by a more basic emotional repugnance at the thought 
of manhandling someone onto the railway tracks.  Parts of the 
brain thought to be associated with abstract thinking were 
activated by the switch story, while parts of the brain 
associated with emotions were stimulated more by the 
manhandling story.171 
Another interpretation is suggested by treating stories as 
basic cognitive units.  The first story—flipping a switch to save 
the five workers—is relatively plausible.  We regularly flip 
switches in daily life.  From movies and books (not to mention 
kids’ cartoons), we are familiar with switching lines to divert 
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 169. Cf.  Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror 
Decision Making: The Story Model, 13 CARDOZO L.  REV.  519, 528 (1991). 
 170. Joshua D.  Greene et al., An fMRI Investigation of Emotional 
Engagement in Moral Judgment, 293 Science 2105 (2001); see John Mikhail, 
Moral Cognition and Computational Theory, in 3 MORAL PSYCHOLOGY: THE 
NEUROSCIENCE OF MORALITY 90 (Walter Sinnott-Armstrong ed., 2007) (calling 
for an explanation that provides a computational basis for moral reasoning); 
see also Sean Kevin Thompson, A Brave New World of Interrogation 
Jurisprudence?, 33 AM.  J.L.  & MED.  341 (2007), (discussing the possible uses 
of fMRI in legal proceedings); Alexandra J.  Roberts, Everything New is Old 
Again: Brain Fingerprinting and Evidentiary Analogy, 9 Yale J.L.  & Tech.  
234 (2007). 
 171. Greene, supra note 170, at 2106–07. 
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things on train-tracks.  The second story is a lot less plausible.  
We seem to understand intuitively that we could not save the 
five workers by jumping in front of the trolley.  It would more 
likely require the mass of the large bystander.  Most of us do 
not throw people around on a regular basis, let alone people 
much larger than we are.  People are more familiar with the 
concept of flipping switches than with throwing people.  The 
story is cleverly concocted to present a nice moral problem, but 
its very cleverness makes it somewhat implausible.  So perhaps 
part of the reason that it gets rejected is its unlikely logic—
especially when it has been juxtaposed with a more plausible, 
accessible scenario.  This is consistent with the fMRI data—as 
the discussion of the copyright case reminded us, our gut 
reactions to implausible stories can have an element of moral 
outrage. 
Cognitive science will play an increasing role in the law, 
from litigation to refinement of doctrine to legal theory to legal 
education.  Studying the cognitive aspects of stories could play 
a role in the law as well, and offers an area where lawyers have 
a particular expertise.  Cognitive science is multi-disciplinary, 
studying human thinking by looking at words and sentences 
(linguists), artificial intelligence (computer scientists), brains 
(neurologists and psychologists), and behavior (anthropologists, 
psychologists again, evolutionary biologists, behavioral 
economists).  Lawyers’ stock-in-trade is the story.172  Lawyers 
view stories from every angle (creating, analyzing, adapting, 
transferring, and disputing).  The study of stories offers a 
particular opportunity for lawyers not just to benefit from 
cognitive science, but to participate. 
 
                                                          
 172. Legal education and practice expose lawyers to numerous stories over 
the years, giving them a practical reasoning, and habit of mind, that may 
differ from other groups; see Lorie Graham, Aristotle’s Ethics and the Virtuous 
Lawyer, in ARISTOTLE AND MODERN LAW 489, 501-05 (Richard O.  Brooks & 
James Bernard Murphy eds., 2003). 
